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729 
HISTORICIZING THE “END OF MEN”: THE POLITICS OF 
REACTION(S) 
SERENA MAYERI∗ 
In fact, the most distinctive change is probably the emergence of an 
American matriarchy, where the younger men especially are unmoored, 
and closer than at any other time in history to being obsolete . . . . 
– Hanna Rosin1 
 
In 1965 a Labor Department official named Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote 
a report entitled The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (the 
Moynihan Report), intended only for internal Johnson Administration use but 
quickly leaked to the press.2 Designed to motivate the President and his 
deputies to launch massive federal employment and anti-poverty initiatives 
directed at impoverished African Americans, Moynihan’s report inadvertently 
sparked a sometimes vitriolic debate that reverberated through the next half 
century of social policy.3 Characterized as everything from a “subtle racist”4 to 
a “prescient”5 prophet, Moynihan and his assessment of black urban family life 
have been endlessly analyzed, vilified, and rehabilitated by commentators in 
the years since his report identified a “tangle of pathology” that threatened the 
welfare and stability of poor African American communities.6 At the center of 
the “pathology” Moynihan lamented was a “matriarchal” family structure 
characterized by “illegitimate” births, welfare dependency, and juvenile 
 
∗ Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to 
Kristin Collins for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay; to Linda McClain, 
Hanna Rosin, and participants in the Conference, “Evaluating Claims About the ‘End of 
Men’: Legal and Other Perspectives,” out of which this Symposium grew; and to the staff of 
the Boston University Law Review for editorial assistance.  
1 HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 82 (2012). 
2 DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965). For a discussion of 
how the report was leaked, see LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN 
REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 136-39 (1967). 
3 See, e.g., JAMES T. PATTERSON, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE OVER BLACK FAMILY LIFE – FROM LBJ TO OBAMA 59-63 (2010); 
RAINWATER & YANCEY, supra note 2, at 216-45. 
4 RAINWATER & YANCEY, supra note 2, at 173. 
5 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 63. 
6 MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 29. 
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delinquency.7 Until “Negro males” reclaimed their proper place as 
breadwinning heads of households, Moynihan’s report suggested, poverty, 
violence, and dysfunction would mar the hard-won progress of the civil rights 
movement and deepen the chasm between black and white Americans.8 Using 
overheated rhetoric designed to capture the attention of policymakers, the 
Moynihan Report essentially forecast the “end of men” in inner-city Black 
America. 
Many liberal commentators and civil rights leaders excoriated the Moynihan 
Report for its unflattering picture of black family life, and interpreted 
Moynihan’s focus on family structure, somewhat unfairly, as a rejection of 
structural, institutional, and economic explanations for poverty and racial 
inequality.9 But Moynihan’s concerns about the growing number of “female-
headed households” and the concomitant “emasculation” of African American 
men reflected a long-lived consensus within the liberal and civil rights 
establishments that a male-breadwinner/female-homemaker model of 
household political economy was integral to racial progress.10 Moynihan’s 
diagnosis of the “pathology” inherent in female household leadership was not 
new; indeed, prominent black scholars, such as sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, 
and civil rights leaders, such as Whitney Young, had long made similar 
observations about the deleterious effects of family breakdown and female 
dominance on racial uplift.11 For these commentators, the rise of women within 
black families – Negro women’s allegedly superior educational attainments 
 
7 See generally id.  
8 See id. 
9 ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
SINCE THE 1960S, at 30 (2012) (stating that Moynihan’s report “became an argument against, 
not for, greater government attention to African American rights – the opposite of what 
Moynihan had intended”); see also PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 61-63 (defending 
Moynihan against charges that he ignored racism and structural inequality as causes of 
poverty among African Americans).  
10 On this liberal consensus, see, for example, MARISA CHAPPELL, THE WAR ON 
WELFARE: FAMILY, POVERTY AND POLITICS IN MODERN AMERICA 37 (2010) (“[T]he 
controversy over [Moynihan’s] report has blinded historians to the larger consensus on the 
importance of family structure to black economic disadvantage.”); RUTH FELDSTEIN, 
MOTHERHOOD IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SEX IN AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1930-1965, 
at 144-52 (2000) (describing commonalities and divergences between Moynihan and his 
liberal critics); SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION 23-26, 41-42 (2011) (describing the liberal conventional wisdom that 
black women’s economic independence undermined racial progress); and SELF, supra note 
9, at 4, 20 (describing “breadwinner liberalism,” the reigning paradigm of 1960s American 
political economy, as epitomized by the Moynihan Report). 
11 See CHAPPELL, supra note 10, at 39 (observing that Whitney Young had earlier made 
an argument almost identical to the thesis of the Moynihan report); FELDSTEIN, supra note 
10, at 28-33 (discussing E. Franklin Frazier’s work, which identified “maternally organized 
families” as an impediment to African American progress). 
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and job prospects – necessarily entailed the end of men. Moynihan and his 
liberal critics also agreed on the appropriate remedy: that government policy 
and resources be focused on improving the employment prospects of Negro 
men with an eye toward reinstating them as primary breadwinners in marital 
households.12 Implicitly or explicitly, this vision entailed African American 
women marrying, withdrawing from the labor market, and staying home to 
care for children without relying on public assistance. With urban unrest 
seizing American cities in the months and years after the Moynihan Report’s 
release, restoring black male breadwinners seemed imperative not only for the 
fight against poverty but for social stability and peace.13 
Many civil rights leaders and social critics to the left of Moynihan assailed 
his report for depicting black families as pathological rather than resilient, for 
feeding stereotypes about black inferiority, and for distorting the magnitude of 
racial differences in family structure.14 But few commentators questioned his 
underlying premise: the “end of men” and the “rise of women” went hand in 
hand, and both developments were problematic. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, the consensus view stipulated that African American women’s 
progress in schools and workplaces and their ascendance to positions of 
community and political leadership were inimical to racial progress. Black 
women’s advancement undermined Negro manhood by upending the 
normative gendered division of family labor; the solution was to restore 
women and children’s dependence on the husbands and fathers whose inferior 
position created not only economic need but social pathology and 
psychological harm. A 1967 column by journalist Lloyd Shearer was a crude 
but not unrepresentative example of this analysis. In this column, Negro 
Problem: Women Rule the Roost, Shearer declared: “Unless and until the 
Negro Family Structure in America becomes a patriarchy instead of the 
matriarchy it now is, this country is not likely to enjoy social peace.”15 Chronic 
unemployment meant that “[d]ependent upon women, [Negro men] soon 
became the object of their scorn, pity, rejection, and tyranny in addition to the 
contempt of their own children.”16 Shearer urged that “American business . . . 
adopt as a motto, ‘Give a Negro man a job,’ with the accent on the words 
 
12 MAYERI, supra note 10, at 25-26. 
13 See SELF, supra note 9, at 30 (“Together the [Moynihan] report and the [Watts] riot 
threatened the black freedom movement’s still-tenuous legitimacy among whites and shifted 
the national discussion away from the moral legitimacy of black demands to familial 
arrangements within the black community.”).  
14 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 59-80; RAINWATER & YANCEY, supra note 2, at 216-44. 
The heated nature of the controversy may have stemmed in part from the fact that 
Moynihan’s report leaked to the press in a “piecemeal” fashion, allowing journalists to seize 
on “its more sensational aspects.” CHAPPELL, supra note 10, at 38. 
15 Lloyd Shearer, Negro Problem: Women Rule the Roost, PARADE, Aug. 20, 1967, at 4, 
4. 
16 Id. at 5. 
  
732 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:729 
 
‘Negro man.’”17 An accompanying photograph of black students working at 
their desks was captioned: “One of the major Negro problems is that females 
are better educated than men. Result too often is that women are qualified for 
better jobs. This continuing cycle must change.”18 Shearer concluded: “The 
Negro man must be made to feel like a man. Pains must be taken to see that he 
reaches a position where he can assume the rightful role of father in the family 
life of American society.”19 Ironically, while many advocates of Black Power 
recoiled from the Moynihan Report and condemned its author,20 the movement 
shared the bedrock assumption that female breadwinning and leadership 
emasculated African American men, with devastating economic and 
psychological consequences.21 
From the moment Moynihan’s analysis – and various interpretations and 
distortions thereof – became public, prominent women in government, 
policymaking, and advocacy circles dissented from the assumptions that drove 
Moynihan and his critics alike. Advocates for women objected to Moynihanian 
discourse on numerous grounds. They vigorously disputed the assertions of 
Moynihan and others that black women were flourishing in comparison to their 
male counterparts. Armed with labor market statistics, feminists pointed out 
that black women’s wages still lagged behind all other demographic groups, 
including black men.22 Black women, they insisted, suffered from multiple and 
intersecting forms of discrimination in education, employment, and political 
life, in addition to shouldering the lion’s share of responsibility for their 
families’ support and care. These advocates argued that while black men 
needed and deserved attention and government resources, initiatives designed 
to bolster the prospects of black women were at least as integral to 
ameliorating poverty and inequality.23 Women in government, in civil rights 
groups, and in women’s organizations old and new agitated for the passage and 
 
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 William Julius Wilson, The Moynihan Report and Research on the Black Community, 
621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 34, 36 (2009) (discussing the Black Power 
movement’s influence on the reaction to the Moynihan Report). 
21 For a discussion of African American feminist responses to the Black Power 
movement, see generally Kimberly Springer, Black Feminists Respond to Black Power 
Masculinism, in THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT: RETHINKING THE CIVIL RIGHTS-BLACK 
POWER ERA (Peniel E. Joseph ed., 2006). See also Wini Breines, Sixties Stories’ Silences: 
White Feminism, Black Feminism, Black Power, 8 NWSA J. 101, 106-08 (1996). 
22 See PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON 
RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 327 (1984) (comparing the wages of black women to white 
women and black men); MAYERI, supra note 10, at 26, 57 (discussing feminist critiques that 
highlighted black women’s economic plight). 
23 See MAYERI, supra note 10, at 41-42 (discussing black feminists who “spotlighted 
intersections between race and sex inequality”).  
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vigorous enforcement of laws against sex discrimination in employment,24 
education,25 and jury service;26 for greater access to birth control and 
abortion;27 for women’s participation in job training programs;28 and for the 
inclusion of women in emerging affirmative action programs.29 
Some commentators have lamented that the visceral negative reactions 
many liberals and civil rights leaders had to the Moynihan Report rendered 
serious discussion of the problems he identified verboten within liberal social 
science and policy circles for years to come, suppressing debate over the role 
of family structure in perpetuating poverty and disadvantage among African 
Americans.30 In his recently published history of the controversy, James 
Patterson argues that this silencing had the paradoxical effect of ceding the 
field to conservatives, who further distorted Moynihan’s analysis by 
downplaying economic and structural determinants of poverty and attributing 
racial inequality and urban decline to cultural pathology remediable only by 
individual and private community initiatives.31 Conservatives not only rejected 
the notion that government resources should be directed at urban poverty, but 
framed government intervention as contributing to economic blight by 
perpetuating dependency on welfare, encouraging non-marital childbearing 
and male desertion, and discouraging marriage and responsible fatherhood.32 
 
24 See NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKPLACE 117-54 (2006); MAYERI, supra note 10, at 20-23 (discussing the inclusion of 
sex discrimination in Title VII). 
25  See, e.g., MAYERI, supra note 10, at 58-60 (discussing legal challenges to the male-
only admission policies of prestigious high schools and colleges). 
26 Id. at 26-29, 173-81 (describing litigation challenging women’s exclusion from jury 
service). For more comprehensive accounts of women’s jury service activism, see LINDA K. 
KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 128-220 (1998), and HOLLY J. 
MCCAMMON, THE U.S. WOMEN’S JURY MOVEMENTS AND STRATEGIC ADAPTATION: A MORE 
JUST VERDICT (2011).  
27  See generally, e.g., DAVID GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1998) (offering a detailed account of the litigation 
campaign against prohibitions on contraception and abortion); LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL 
PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA (2002); LINDA 
GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE (2011) (describing feminist activism 
for abortion rights prior to the Supreme Court’s decision decriminalizing abortion).  
28 MACLEAN, supra note 24, at 142-43. 
29 See id. at 147-54, 306-32. 
30 See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 135-36; Wilson, supra note 20, at 37 (“[I]n the 
aftermath of th[e] controversy [over the Moynihan Report] and in an effort to protect their 
work from the charge of racism, or of blaming the victim, many liberal social scientists 
tended to avoid describing any behavior that could be construed as unflattering or 
stigmatizing to people of color.”).  
31 See PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 147-65 (describing conservative interpretations of 
Moynihan’s thesis). 
32 See id. at 140-41. From a different perspective, historian Deborah Gray White charges 
that despite Moynihan’s apparently benign intent, his report and the ensuing controversy 
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But the research of historians of African American and feminist activism 
suggest another side to the Moynihan Report and the reactions it provoked – a 
more productive and generative side.33 Far from choking off debate among 
advocates for women, the report helped to provide a focal point for feminist 
advocacy, not only on behalf of the rise of women, but against the notion that 
the rise of women necessarily meant the end of men. 
* * * 
Feminists saw ghosts of the Moynihan Report everywhere in the decade 
following its publication.34 National Organization for Women (NOW) 
President Aileen Hernandez wrote in 1970 that “[s]o many of [Moynihan’s] 
damaging notions have formed the basis of the federal policies which either 
ignore women altogether or actually worsen their circumstances.”35 From job 
training (“manpower”) programs that favored men over women, to affirmative 
action plans designed primarily to move men into traditionally male 
occupations, to the EEOC’s failure to enforce Title VII against sex 
discrimination in employment, to complaints about rising rates of 
“illegitimacy” and welfare dependency, to educational enrichment programs 
that excluded girls of color, feminists of various stripes identified Moynihanian 
thinking as the culprit behind government policy that assumed that the best 
way to advance the fortunes of African American men was to promote the 
gendered family-wage model as the sine qua non of middle-class success.36 
 
dealt, at least temporarily, a fatal blow to the efforts of black women’s organizations to 
rehabilitate the image of black women in the public mind – to combat stereotypes about 
black women’s supposed promiscuity, domineering nature, and emasculation of black men. 
DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, TOO HEAVY A LOAD: BLACK WOMEN IN DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES, 
1894-1994, at 198-201 (1999). 
33 In a review of Patterson’s book on the Moynihan Report, historian Felicia Kornbluh 
argues persuasively that “[f]rom the perspectives of women’s and African American history 
. . . the controversies [over the Moynihan Report] may have been more productive than 
destructive . . . .” Felicia Kornbluh, Book Review, 117 AM. HIST. REV. 236, 237 (2012). For 
a sampling of works of African American and women’s history that discuss the feminist 
reaction to the Moynihan Report, see, for example, CHAPPELL, supra note 10, at 47-48; 
GIDDINGS, supra note 22, at 328-29; ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: 
WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 269-
70 (2001); MACLEAN, supra note 24, at 230-31; MAYERI, supra note 10, at 24-26, 41-51; 
KIMBERLY SPRINGER, LIVING FOR THE REVOLUTION: BLACK FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS, 1968-
1980, at 37-39 (2005); and WHITE, supra note 32, at 201-03. See also SELF, supra note 9, at 
32 (observing that the Moynihan Report provided a “starting point for a distinctly African 
American feminism”). 
34 See MAYERI, supra note 10, at 42. 
35 Id. at 41 (quoting Letter from Aileen Hernandez, President, NOW, to Merrillee A. 
Dolan, Coordinator, NOW Women and Poverty Task Force (December 15, 1970) (on file 
with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University)). 
36 See id. at 42-75 (describing feminist challenges to discriminatory policies and the 
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The feminist response to Moynihan was affirmative as well as defensive. 
Feminists – particularly African American feminists – offered an alternative 
vision of the family structure that government policy should promote. 
Moynihan and his interpreters suggested that African American families 
should pattern themselves on the male-breadwinner/female-homemaker ideal 
that had animated public policy since before the New Deal.37 The more subtle 
analyses (including Moynihan’s) acknowledged that there was nothing 
inherently superior about patriarchy, but nevertheless maintained that black 
Americans deviated from the governing paradigm of white America at their 
own peril.38 In sharp contrast, African American feminists such as Pauli 
Murray, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Patricia Roberts Harris, and Aileen 
Hernandez positioned black women as role models for white women, and 
egalitarian black marriages as worthy of white couples’ emulation.39 Norton 
encouraged African American women to “pioneer in establishing new male-
female relationships around two careers.”40 She told the New York Times in 
1970: “‘The black wom[a]n already has a rough equality which came into 
existence out of necessity and is now ingrained in the black life style. . . . 
[T]hat give[s] the black family very much of a head-start on egalitarian family 
life.’”41 Norton forecast that, “fortified by her uncommon experience as co-
breadwinner in the family, the black woman can be expected to move . . . into 
far wider participation in business and in all higher-paying occupations – quite 
possibly in advance of white women.”42 Norton expressed this view in even 
starker terms in 1972, telling Ms., “Black family life will be a disaster if it 
copies white family life.”43 Instead, Norton and her compatriots argued that 
African American men and women should aspire to model gender 
 
complicated relationship between feminist and black progressive organizations).  
37 On the male-breadwinner/female-homemaker model, or “family-wage” ideal, see, for 
example, CHAPPELL, supra note 10, at 65-105 (examining legislative attempts to support a 
male-breadwinner model); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 33, at 40-42 (discussing the 
“family-wage” concept of male and female employment); and MACLEAN, supra note 24, at 
16-17 (discussing the origins of the family-wage model and its dominance in the mid-
twentieth century). 
38 MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 29 (“There is, presumably, no special reason why a 
society in which males are dominant in family relationships is to be preferred to a 
matriarchal arrangement. However, it is clearly a disadvantage for a minority group to be 
operating on one principle, while the great majority of the population . . . is operating on 
another.”).  
39 MAYERI, supra note 10, at 41-51. 
40 JOAN STEINAU LESTER, ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON: FIRE IN MY SOUL 148 (2003). 
41 Charlayne Hunter, Many Blacks Wary of ‘Women’s Liberation’ Movement in U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1970, at 47. 
42 Eleanor H. Norton, For Black Women, Opportunities Open, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1971, 
at NER40. 
43 Cellestine Ware, The Black Family and Feminism: A Conversation with Eleanor 
Holmes Norton, MS., Spring 1972, at 95, 96. 
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egalitarianism in a sex- and race-stratified society: “Let’s build an entirely new 
kind of family with the recognition that there may be two people who work, 
two people who are strong, and nobody has to be dependent.”44 As Pauli 
Murray put it: “People who blame our troubles on ‘Negro matriarchy’ are 
ignoring a source of strength in Negro women that ought to be available to 
white women, too.”45 In 1969 journalist Caroline Bird reported that Murray 
“would like to see black women use their psychic freedoms to pioneer 
egalitarian marriages which can serve as models for young people of both 
sexes and races.”46 
Like the social science on which Moynihan based his report, black feminist 
ideas about African Americans modeling gender egalitarianism to white 
couples were not new. As the historian Christina Simmons has demonstrated, 
African American thinkers had explored similar themes since at least the early 
twentieth century.47 But never before had these theories been tied to a robust 
public policy agenda, and never before had feminists been better positioned to 
advance their vision in legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies. 
This gender egalitarian vision of marriage, in which husbands and wives 
shared breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities, animated many of the 
constitutional sex equality cases that came before the Supreme Court in the 
1970s. After decades of federal policy shoring up the male-
breadwinner/female-homemaker model, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s litigation 
campaign attacked government preference for traditional gendered divisions of 
family labor.48 Ginsburg and her allies insisted that the state could no longer 
assume that women were always economically dependent upon men, or that 
wives never provided for their husbands and children, or that a father’s care 
was less important than a mother’s. In a series of cases challenging sex-
specific allocations of government benefits, this campaign largely succeeded in 
rendering marriage formally gender neutral.49 In the eyes of the law, husbands 
 
44 Id. 
45 Caroline Bird, Black Womanpower, NEW YORK, Mar. 10, 1969, at 36, 38. 
46 Id. 
47 See CHRISTINA SIMMONS, MAKING MARRIAGE MODERN: WOMEN’S SEXUALITY FROM 
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO WORLD WAR II, at 150-64 (2009) (discussing how African 
Americans “pioneered” sexually egalitarian marriages); Christina Simmons, “Modern 
Marriage” for African Americans, 1920-1940, 30 CANADIAN REV. AM. STUD. 273, 294 
(2000). 
48 For more on Ginsburg’s litigation campaign, see MAYERI, supra note 10, at 50-185 
(examining litigation against policies discriminating on the basis of sex), and Cary Franklin, 
The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 83, 84-88 (2010) (discussing Ginsburg’s use of male plaintiffs in sex discrimination 
cases as a challenge to traditional gender roles). 
49 See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 93 (1979) (invalidating the provision of 
public assistance to families with unemployed fathers but not to those with unemployed 
mothers); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a statute which 
required only husbands to pay alimony); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201-02 (1977) 
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and wives were now mostly fungible spouses; the government could no longer 
overtly penalize nontraditional divisions of family labor. In a way, the African 
American feminist vision of marriage had come to fruition as a matter of 
formal legal doctrine, albeit not social reality. 
To be sure, this vision and its implementation suffered from limitations. 
Neutralizing the benefits of marriage did little for the increasing numbers of 
women (and men) for whom marriage remained out of reach. For these 
Americans, combating discrimination in employment, broadening access to 
education and health care, strengthening the safety net, expanding the rights of 
non-marital children and their parents, and navigating the end of an era of 
prosperity undoubtedly took precedence. As I have explored elsewhere, 
feminists attacked these problems as well, with varying results.50 But feminist 
advocates did succeed in undermining the assumption that pervaded the debate 
over the Moynihan Report – that is, that a male-breadwinner/female-
homemaker model was the gold standard for family structure generally and for 
racial progress in particular. 
Feminists also sought to dispel the view that the rise of women necessarily 
implicated the end of men. Ginsburg’s use of male plaintiffs in many of the 
constitutional sex equality cases is one of the more visible manifestations of 
this ethos.51 NOW’s mission statement expressed a vision of feminism in 
which women strove for equality “in partnership with men.”52 Feminist 
advocates such as Norton, Hernandez, Murray, and Harris insisted that 
attacking economic disadvantage and inequality need not be a zero-sum game 
pitting men against women, or black against white.53  
Contemporary fears about the end of men – and the rise of women – did not 
fade in the years after the Moynihan Report drew attention to family structure 
 
(holding that widows and widowers must be equally entitled to survivors’ benefits); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975) (holding that a father was entitled 
to Social Security benefits to care for his child after his wife’s death, just as a similarly 
situated mother would have been); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973) 
(holding unconstitutional a law that required military servicewomen to establish that their 
husbands relied on them for support to receive certain housing and medical benefits 
automatically available to servicemen). 
50 See MAYERI, supra note 10, passim (discussing various challenges faced by feminists). 
In forthcoming work, I will explore more fully how feminist and other efforts to challenge 
the legal primacy of marriage during this period met with limited success. See generally 
Serena Mayeri, The Status of Marriage: Marital Supremacy Challenged and Remade, 1960-
2000 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
51 For discussion of Ginsburg’s use of male plaintiffs, see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING 
GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 208-31 (2000), and 
Franklin, supra note 48, at 84-88. 
52 Betty Friedan, The National Organization for Women’s 1966 Statement of Purpose, 
NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, http://www.now.org/history/purpos66.html (last visited Mar. 1, 
2013). 
53 See MAYERI, supra note 10, at 45-51. 
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and its relationship to poverty. In the 1970s anxiety about the decline of men’s 
earning power and the traditional family intensified and spread across racial 
and class lines. As the historian Natasha Zaretsky describes, by the early 
1970s, “anxiety that middle- and upper-class families were coming to resemble 
their poorer counterparts was accompanied by the related fear that the 
ostensibly stable divide between white and black families was breaking 
down.”54 Perhaps Pauli Murray was the prescient one when she observed in 
1966 that “the Negro male may be undergoing in an aggravated form some of 
the problems of adjustment confronting American males generally as the trend 
of women out of the home into paid occupations continues.”55 Demographic 
phenomena such as non-marital childbearing, single-parent households, and 
women’s workforce participation that Moynihan identified in mid-1960s black 
America increasingly became features of American life more generally.56 By 
1979 Christopher Lasch lamented that white “middle-class society has become 
a pale copy of the black ghetto.”57 
African American family life, in both its gender-egalitarian professional and 
struggling single-parent guises, proved a bellwether for American society more 
generally. The gap between the affluent, educated, and married on the one 
hand, and the working class and poor, less educated, and increasingly 
unmarried on the other, grew in a way that not only crossed racial lines but 
also accentuated the gap between rich and poor – a gap that was strongly 
correlated with race. By 1985 Eleanor Holmes Norton was writing candidly in 
the New York Times of the toll family breakdown had taken on black 
communities.58 She credited the Moynihan Report with identifying troubling 
trends that had only worsened in the twenty years since its release.59 Norton 
called for both government intervention and community initiatives to address 
poverty and racial inequality. But she did not prescribe different remedies for 
black men and black women, or call for a return to a male-breadwinner/female-
homemaker model. Instead, she encouraged government agencies and 
community groups to devote resources to finding gainful employment for 
women and men; improving education and job training for boys and girls; 
 
54 NATASHA ZARETSKY, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND THE FEAR OF 
NATIONAL DECLINE, 1968-1980, at 13 (2007). 
55 Murray speculated that “the dislocations . . . may have affected Negro males somewhat 
sooner than white males because of the historical necessity for Negro women to work.” 
Letter from Pauli Murray to William Yancey (Jan. 25, 1966) (on file with Schlesinger 
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University). 
56 ZARETSKY, supra note 54, at 13. 
57 CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM 67 (1979), quoted in ZARETSKY, 
supra note 54, at 208. 
58 Eleanor Holmes Norton, Restoring the Traditional Black Family, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 
1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 43. 
59 Id. 
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moving mothers from welfare to work; and, ideally, moving fathers into jobs 
and back into homes and parental roles.60 
Statements like Norton’s are often portrayed as acknowledgements that 
Moynihan was right after all.61 But Norton’s diagnosis of the problem differed 
in significant ways from the views expressed by Moynihan and his non-
feminist critics twenty years earlier, and the remedies she proposed did not 
perpetuate the assumption that racial progress depended on men and women 
assuming distinctive roles as breadwinners and homemakers. To put it another 
way, she did not assume that the rise of women meant the end of men – or vice 
versa – but rather that men and women would rise or fall together. 
Since 1985 some elements of both Norton and Moynihan’s visions have 
become official policy. A longtime champion of equal employment 
opportunity for women, Norton proposed that women on public assistance 
receive training and jobs that would enable them to be self-sufficient, a major 
objective of subsequent welfare reform.62 The connections Moynihan drew 
between non-marriage and poverty are visible in the marriage-promotion 
initiatives implemented in recent years.63 The premise of the latter initiatives 
derives from the old consensus that a gendered family wage model is the best 
escape hatch from poverty. 
Significantly, though, other aspects of their prescriptions have languished. 
Norton’s version of “welfare-to-work” required that women and their families 
receive government support in the form of subsidized day care and, if decent 
jobs were not available in the private sector, public employment programs.64 
Moynihan had once promoted a guaranteed minimum income for impoverished 
families.65 Work requirements without adequate support and marriage 
promotion without measures to alleviate poverty left both the gender-based 
family-wage model and the gender-egalitarian partnership model out of reach 
 
60 Id.  
61 See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 150-52 (discussing Norton’s article and other 
commentary at the time that appeared to support Moynihan’s thesis). Norton herself credited 
the Moynihan Report in her 1985 article. Norton, supra note 58. 
62 Norton, supra note 58. 
63 For critical scholarly views of marriage promotion initiatives, see, for example, LINDA 
C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 117-41 (2006) (“[T]he program of marriage promotion advanced by the 
marriage movement and by governmental actors championing marriage as an antipoverty 
strategy has serious flaws. Marriage promotion efforts have not adequately promoted 
equality within families and equality among families.”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The 
Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 
93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1653 (2005) (criticizing marriage promotion initiatives as a tool 
historically used to oppress African Americans). 
64 Norton, supra note 58. 
65 According to Patterson, Moynihan had second thoughts about guaranteed income 
when local experiments seemed to suggest that the policy was correlated with marital break-
up. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 123. 
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for most poor families.66 But it is still worth observing that these are two very 
different visions of the good – one seeks racial and socioeconomic equity 
through a gendered division of labor, the other seeks gender egalitarianism as 
well as race and class equality. Moreover, these two visions entail very 
different remedial implications and policy prescriptions. 
The chasms between the positions of today’s feminist organizations and 
today’s conservatives are even easier to see, and they illuminate the somewhat 
subtler distinctions between the approaches of Norton and Moynihan. 
Feminists have long argued that, rather than fostering women’s dependence 
upon men, public policy should strengthen the economic position of single 
mothers by enabling them to be independent of male partners.67 They point out 
that dependence on men not only makes women less self-sufficient, but also 
traps them in violent relationships: oft-cited statistics show that as many as 
sixty-five percent of welfare recipients have suffered from domestic violence.68 
Rather than promoting marriage, feminists contend, we should devote public 
resources to programs that enable women’s economic self-sufficiency and 
promote children’s welfare. Rather than lamenting rising rates of 
“illegitimacy” and attempting to make non-marital childbearing more costly, 
we should try to ameliorate poverty directly, and try to make “unwed 
motherhood” morally and, more important, economically neutral. 
 Many of these arguments have their roots in alliances between feminists and 
welfare rights advocates, whose organized opposition to the subordination of 
“welfare mothers” peaked in the early 1970s. National Welfare Rights 
Organization Chairwoman Johnnie Tillmon put the feminist welfare rights 
critique most memorably when she wrote in 1972 that welfare was “like a 
super-sexist marriage. You trade in a man for the man. But you can’t divorce 
him if he treats you bad. He can divorce you, of course, cut you off any time he 
wants. But in that case, he keeps the kids, not you.”69 Welfare rights advocates 
exposed how officials invaded the privacy of recipients to ensure they were not 
secretly depending upon a male breadwinner, but provided neither sufficient 
aid nor the prospect of decent employment to enable women and children to 
 
66  LAURA LEIN ET AL., LIFE AFTER WELFARE: REFORM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY 
62 (2007) (concluding that few women who leave welfare find jobs that pay enough to 
support their families); MCCLAIN, supra note 63, at 132-34 (discussing how marriage 
promotion programs do not address the effects of poverty which make healthy relationships 
difficult for the poor to maintain). 
67 See, e.g., CHAPPELL, supra note 10, at 103 (describing NOW Poverty Task Force Chair 
Merrillee Dolan’s view that “[p]reservation of the [male-breadwinner] family is not the 
business of government,” and Dolan’s “preferred solution to women’s poverty – a generous 
guaranteed income with work incentives, adequate affordable child care, and full 
employment with vigorous antidiscrimination enforcement” which “aimed instead to make 
women ‘economically independent’” (alteration in original)). 
68 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS 4 (1998). 
69 Johnnie Tillmon, Welfare is a Women’s Issue, MS., Spring 1972, at 111, 111. 
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become financially independent.70 In the 1960s and early 1970s, the price of 
public assistance could be sexual abstinence or even involuntary sterilization; 
more uniformly, it was humiliation and loss of control over body and 
household economy.71 Tillmon described its perversity in vivid terms: 
The man runs everything. In ordinary marriage, sex is supposed to be for 
your husband. On A.F.D.C. [(Aid to Families with Dependent Children)] 
you’re not supposed to have any sex at all. You give up control of your 
own body. It’s a condition of aid. . . . The man, the welfare system, 
controls your money. He tells you what to buy, what not to buy, where to 
buy it, and how much things cost.72  
The welfare-rights critique highlighted the shortcomings of work requirements 
in the absence of education, training, and good jobs with adequate pay: “There 
are some ten million jobs that now pay less than the minimum wage, and if 
you’re a woman, you’ve got the best chance of getting one.”73 Tillmon, who 
had worked for years in a Los Angeles laundry to singlehandedly support her 
six children, called for a guaranteed minimum income for all families, 
regardless of their structure: “There would be no ‘categories’ – men, women, 
children, single, married, kids, no kids – just poor people who need aid.”74 
Tillmon and her allies helped to make welfare and single motherhood feminist 
issues, working not for the end of men, but for the end of “The Man.” 
In the wake of recent media coverage of the rise in non-marital childbearing 
among American women, feminist commentators and organizations have 
sought to reframe the discussion of single motherhood.75 Feminists highlighted 
 
70 On the history of the welfare rights movement, see generally MARTHA F. DAVIS, 
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993); FELICIA 
KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POVERTY AND POLITICS IN MODERN 
AMERICA (2007); PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); ANNELISE ORLECK, STORMING CAESARS PALACE: 
HOW BLACK MOTHERS FOUGHT THEIR OWN WAR ON POVERTY (2005); and GUIDA WEST, 
THE NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT: THE SOCIAL PROTEST OF POOR WOMEN 
(1981).  
71 For discussion of involuntary sterilization during this period, see generally Lisa C. 
Ikemoto, Infertile by Force and Federal Complicity: The Story of Relf v. Weinberger, in 
WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 
2011). See also REBECCA M. KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION AND REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 1950-1980, at chs. 3, 5 (2009); JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR 
AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 68-69 (2003) (discussing proposed punitive 
sterilization laws). 
72 Tillmon, supra note 69, at 111. 
73 Id. at 112. 
74 Id. at 114. 
75 This effort is not new. See, e.g., NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT 
FAMILIES, at xv (1997) (“The stigmatizing of single parents informs popular culture, and, in 
so doing, justifies the structure of policies and institutions that have enormous impact on the 
lives of single parents and their families.”). 
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the conflation of “female-headed households” with inevitable poverty, 
trumpeted the positive outcomes that mothers could achieve with more 
extensive social and economic support, and exposed the dearth of such support 
in the United States at the time as compared with other developed countries 
where households headed by single mothers had a greater chance to flourish.76 
Legal Momentum, for instance, issued a statement condemning the New York 
Times’ coverage of the relationship between family structure and poverty as 
“sexist” and “misogynistic” in its equation of father absence with “chaos,” and 
an utter lack of “discipline and structure.”77 The organization then prepared a 
report, Single Motherhood in the United States – A Snapshot,78 and followed 
up a few weeks later with another statement, “Latest Poverty Data Highlights 
Critical Need to Strengthen the Social Safety Net,” reporting that the poverty 
rate for single-mother households had reached a fifteen-year high of 40.1%.79 
The subtitle, “Poverty Remains High, Gender Poverty Gap Grows,” seemed 
implicitly to refute claims that the economic downturn should be considered a 
“he-cession” or a “mancession.”80  
The positions of today’s feminist organizations have roots in both Norton’s 
and Tillmon’s brands of feminism, but also respond to the rightward shift in 
welfare policy and politics.81 In today’s political climate, arguing for a 
guaranteed minimum income is a non-starter, and dramatic reforms to the 
welfare system presuppose limits on the duration of public assistance and the 
desirability of moving recipients into jobs. Feminists’ responses to these 
reforms are, perhaps by necessity, largely reactive: calling for changes to the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, which replaced 
AFDC with stringent time limits and work requirements;82 critiquing 
requirements that mothers, especially victims of intimate violence, cooperate in 
 
76 For such commentary in the popular press, see, for example, Katie Roiphe, Op-Ed., In 
Defense of Single Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2012, at SR8 (arguing that the 
problems associated with single-parent families are primarily economic and not a result of 
family structure per se). 
77 Legal Momentum Responds to New York Times on Single Mothers, LEGAL 
MOMENTUM (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.legalmomentum.org/news-room/announcements/l 
egal-momentum-responds-to.html. 
78 See LEGAL MOMENTUM, SINGLE MOTHERHOOD IN THE UNITED STATES – A SNAPSHOT 
(2012), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/sites/default/files/reports/single-mother 
s-snapshot_0.pdf. 
79 Press Release, Legal Momentum, Latest Poverty Data Highlights Critical Need to 
Strengthen the Social Safety Net (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://www.legalmomentum. 
org/news-room/latest-poverty-data.html.  
80 See id. 
81 Norton herself, writing at the beginning of the second Reagan Administration, may 
have been responding to this rightward shift as well. 
82  See, e.g., GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END 43-44 (1998) (criticizing TANF’s work 
requirements and pointing out that the program creates incentives for women to marry). 
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establishing paternity and seeking child support from fathers;83 opposing 
“family caps” or “child exclusion” policies that limit aid to women who have 
additional children;84 promoting the availability and affordability of child care 
for women with young children who must work outside the home;85 supporting 
funding for education and job training programs that afford opportunities for 
upward mobility;86 combating the assumption that encouraging marriage 
should be a primary objective of welfare reform;87 and opposing funding bans 
for contraception, abortion, and other reproductive health services for low-
income and poor women.88 
These contemporary realities may be sufficient to explain feminist 
skepticism regarding claims about the “end of men” and the “rise of women” – 
and in particular, to the linkage between male decline and female 
empowerment. Feminists worry that emphasizing women’s gains and men’s 
losses will undermine everything from anti-discrimination laws, to an already 
anemic social safety net, to effective enforcement of laws against rape and 
domestic violence. To be sure, Rosin’s analysis is more nuanced than the title 
of her book reflects. And her tone is one of neither despair nor celebration. But 
perhaps inevitably, the headlines and generalizations often trump the details 
and caveats. 
 
83 See, e.g., id. at 71-77 (“[M]andatory paternity establishment and child support 
provisions mark poor single mothers as a separate caste, subject to a separate system of 
law.”). 
84 See ELLEN REESE, BACKLASH AGAINST WELFARE MOTHERS: PAST AND PRESENT 190-91 
(2005) (describing feminist opposition to “family caps” on welfare benefits). 
85 See CHAPPELL, supra note 10, at 248 (describing the demands of some feminists that 
working women receive state-supported child care). 
86 See, e.g., MINK, supra note 82, at 138 (advocating education and job training 
programs); Felicia Kornbluh, The Goals of the National Welfare Rights Movement: Why We 
Need Them Thirty Years Later, 24 FEMINIST STUD. 65, 75-76 (1998) (“[F]eminist scholars 
should help students who are struggling to maintain [welfare] benefits while they are in 
community or four-year colleges.”). 
87 See MINK, supra note 82, at 66-67 (criticizing the moralistic tone of welfare reform); 
see also MCCLAIN, supra note 63; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 63. 
88 See, e.g., Rickie Solinger, Dependency and Choice: The Two Faces of Eve, in WHOSE 
WELFARE? 7, 33 (Gwendolyn Mink ed., 1999) (discussing how Congress prevents public 
funds from being used to pay for abortions). Collections of primary documents relating to 
the history of public assistance and welfare reform can be found in WELFARE: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS (Gwendolyn Mink & Rickie Solinger 
eds., 2003) and WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS, 1935-1996, 
at 2 (Premilla Nadasen et al. eds., 2009). Compelling studies of the workings of the welfare 
system since 1996 include KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW 
SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK (1997); KAARYN S. 
GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
POVERTY (2011); and LEIN ET AL., supra note 66. 
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What can the history of past “end-of-men” claims and the reactions they 
have inspired add to our understanding of today’s debate?89 The most obvious 
takeaway is that today’s claims about the “end of men” are nothing new – 
neither are wildly variant interpretations of the same statistical and anecdotal 
data. One person’s “feminist paradise” – which, as Rosin aptly acknowledges, 
the world she describes is not90 – is another’s “pathological” “matriarchy.” 
Complex and nuanced pieces of writing are reduced to simplistic sound bites, 
molded to fit ideological preconceptions, or just plain distorted. 
In the past, claims about the “end of men” (and the “rise of women”) have 
had real consequences. They have fostered public policies and discourses that 
reinforced, or attempted to reinvigorate, traditional gender norms. They have 
led to misconceptions about the relationship between male decline and female 
advantage, impeding the recognition that trends which hurt men are not likely 
to benefit women in the long run (or perhaps even the short run). They have, 
often inadvertently, obscured economic, racial, and other inequalities of power 
by drawing attention to gender differences that are in fact mediated or 
constituted by other status hierarchies. But describing what is in fact a partial, 
ambivalent set of trends among particular subsets of the population as 
universal and stark can provoke introspection and inspire action. From a 
historian’s perspective, it is far too soon to assess the reaction to recent “end-
of-men” claims, much less their long-term impact on policy or academic and 
popular discourse. It does seem safe to say that past assertions that the end of 
men is at hand have sparked reactions – from feminists and others – that 
helped to galvanize activism to change norms, laws, and public policies in 
progressive as well as reactionary directions.  
 
 
89 By asking this question, I do not mean to equate The End of Men with the Moynihan 
Report or the 1970s economic downturn with the Great Recession. 
90 See ROSIN, supra note 1, at 93. 
